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Abstract 
The analysis of the technology and costs of the gas distribution networks highlights that the 
number of customers is more important than the amount  of gas delivered, as well as the absence 
of economies of scale, the presence of economies of density and the significant role of the 
morphologic and demographic variables. The diversification towards other services, such as 
water and electricity, provides good opportunities for efficiency. The lower costs for private 
operators and the constant economies of scale indicate that the privatisation process should 
continue and confirm the benefits of having many operators (yardstick competition). The control 
of monopoly rents in efficient conditions requires the use of a tariff system similar to a price-
cap, provided that it takes into account the territorial constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
Local gas distribution to families and firms is a service industry that transfers fuel 
from the large national transportation networks to the residences of the customers. As 
such, it is part of the number of so-called  network utilities. It is well-known that this 
situation gives rise to delicate regulation questions given the nature of essential public 
services, and the conditions of natural monopoly at local level. The use of natural gas 
distributed by means of a network creates social and individual advantages, such as the 
safe-guarding of the environment and the elasticity and continuity of the supply. 
However, the choice for the consumer turns out to be limited at local level. The 
interfuel competition gives the consumer the possibility of turning to alternative forms 
of energy, but this opportunity is influenced, at least in the short term, by the costs and 
times necessary for the substitution of utilisation systems. 
Regulation must satisfy many needs. Firstly, it is necessary to pinpoint the cheapest 
productive structure for the sector with regard to the size and degree of specialisation of 
the firms. On this subject, European experience provides different answers: in some 
countries the model of the large vertically integrated national firm has been chosen 
(England and France), in others there are regional and municipal firms horizontally 
integrated in the supply of water and electricity (Germany and Belgium). Important 
indications regarding the above-mentioned different configurations can derive from the 
analysis of scale  and scope economies. The definition of the ownership structure of the 
distribution firms and the setting-up of the tariff system are equally important. On this 
question too, the European experience does not offer a consistent solution because, 
depending on the country, a higher number of public organisations or private firms can 
be found, as well as different pricing systems. Basically, it is necessary to ensure the 
economic-financial equilibrium of the firms and to avoid the waste and inefficiency that 
weigh upon the consumers. This aim can be reached by identifying the factors that 
objectively influence service costs. 
In short, the answer to the many objectives presented above requires the selection 
of the organisational and territorial variables that, in the real experience of the firms 
operating in the sector, actually influence the structure and dimension of costs. The 
econometric estimate of the long-term cost function provides a concise picture that is 
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useful for the interpretation of the role and interaction between such variables and the 
type of technology of the sector. Moreover, the situation of gas distribution in Italy has 
a peculiarity that is unique in Europe: it has, at the same time, the highest degree of 
fragmentation of the offer and a considerable presence of private firms (Rosselli 
Foundation, 1995). The analysis of Italian operators can therefore offer useful 
indications for the regulation in other European countries. In addition, the presence of a 
vertically disintegrated structure can provide useful references for the study of similar 
sectors, such as the distribution of water and/or electricity. 
The following work aims at researching the conditions of service costs for gas 
distribution in Italy by means of the econometric estimate of a long-term cost function 
based on disaggregated firm data. As far as the structure of the research is concerned, in 
the next section some interpretative models deriving from the empirical analysis of the 
sector are examined. The third section presents the methodology proposed, the 
explanatory variables and the functional form used. In the fourth paragraph there is a 
description of the data base, while the fifth one comments on the results of the 
estimates. Some policy indications are included in section six, while section seven 
concludes. 
2. Previous empirical research 
Few empirical contributions on costs and technology in the gas sector are available 
in the literature. This lack is especially heightened with regards to Europe where 
productive structures characterised by only one large vertically integrated national 
operator prevail in major countries. Vice versa, the situation in North America, 
characterised by greater competition, forms the bulk of most of the available analyses. 
The first point of interest concerns the economies of scale and density. On this 
subject, Guldmann (1983) proposes an analysis by means of suitably neo-classical cost 
function to consider the specificity of the utility under investigation. It is a multi-output 
cost function, and the importance of the characteristics of the territory served is 
highlighted. The costs of the systems depend on the number of customers and the 
quantity sold to each type of them (residential and non-residential), as well as the 
density of the population. The price factors are omitted because they are considered 
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constant. In fact, the function is estimated on the data of the territorial divisions 
belonging to two different firms evaluated separately. A simple linear version as well as 
a  functional firm linear in the logarithms  are tested with the following results for the 
latter: 
ln C = 5.675 + 0.245 ln S1 + 0.504 ln N1 + 0.065 ln S2 + 0.099 ln N2 - 0.067 lnD 
(4.82)  (1.04)           (2.01)          (2.37)        (1.79)    (-1.57) 
where: C = Cost of plants, N1 = N° residential customers (families), S1 = Volumes sold 
to residential customers, N2 = N° non-residential customers (commercial and industrial 
firms), S2 = Volumes sold to non-residential customers, D = Density 
(inhabitants/surface area). 
Following the work of Baumol (1977) on multi-product firms, Guldmann analyses 
scale economies. The latter are indicated by the output elasticity of costs for sales and 
consumers of the two categories. For the two firms, elasticity is equal to 0.939 and 
0.913 respectively. These values lead  to the hypothesis of the presence of weak 
economies of scale that, when tested, turn out to be significant only in the second case. 
In both functions, however, significant economies of density can be found: an increase 
of the output over the same territory served produces a less than proportional increase in 
costs. 
In his following work (1984), Guldmann improves the functional form. This study 
highlights that the output elasticity of costs is not constant, but depends on the market 
size and territorial concentration of the population served. In addition the analysis 
shows that the economies of density decrease as the market size increases because of 
the congestion of urban areas. 
Further investigations (Guldmann, 1985) carried out using simulations on the 
estimated functions enable the author to evaluate the consequences of alternative market 
forms, characterised by competition. The presence of several firms in the same area, 
operating competitively on each part of the territory, does not seem advantageous; on 
the other hand the division of the service to each area amongst the smaller firms would 
seem to be suitable. The process would turn out to be particularly positive if the firms 
were specialised in a single kind of customers (residential, non-residentia). The latter 
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observation would mean important policy implications, but the real feasibility of such a 
theory would have to be checked thoroughly, especially bearing in mind the network 
constraints. 
Productive specialisation and diversification are thoroughly examined by Sing 
(1987). The author tries to verify whether the firms that provide both electricity and gas 
are more efficient. This would mean that scope economies exist between the two 
services (Panzar and Willig, 1977, 1981). A translogarithmic function of the operating 
costs is estimated, where the base variables are: the quantities sold of the two outputs, 
the prices of the inputs and the density of the customers on the territory. The estimate is 
based on  1981 data on a sample of 108 American firms, 43 of which are multi-output, 
34 are mainly electrical and 31 are basically geared towards gas distribution. The results 
are uncertain but they seem to point towards the presence of diseconomies. The  higher 
costs for the multi-output firms can be attributed, according to the author, to the higher 
qualitative levels of the service offered . 
In a more extensive work on tariff levels, Hollas (1990) also deals with the subject 
of diversification with opposite results. The average cost functions for different kinds of 
customers are estimated. The Cobb-Douglas functions consider numerous variables 
such as the quantities sold, the number of customers, the prices of the productive 
factors, the storage capacity, the density, the degree of productive specialisation, the 
ownership structures and the forms of regulation. The comparison between private and 
public firms shows higher costs for the  unregulated municipals while lower costs for 
multi-output firms emerge. The effects of density (measured by the ratio between the 
number of consumers and the length of the networks) turn out to be extremely positive. 
The subject of diversification cannot however be separated from that of regulation 
and market power. In two studies on allocative efficiency in the sector, Hollas e Stansell 
(1988, 1994) reach the following conclusions: 
. the rigidity of regulation has a negative influence on efficiency; 
. multi-output firms (gas and electricity) obtain inferior performances due to their 
monopoly power in the energy market; 
. private firms have a slightly higher total efficiency as compared to public firms. 
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Millward and Ward’s study (1987) on the firms operating in Great Britain prior to 
the nationalisation of the sector is concerned with the role of ownership structure. The 
authors, by using a translogarithmic cost function, propose a comparison between 
public and private firms that does not show any particular differences in performance. 
The results must however be considered with extreme caution, because the data refers to 
the end of the last century, and  technology then was different from now (firms were 
vertically integrated and distributed gas that was self-produced by means of the 
distillation of carbon). 
As far as market competitivity is concerned, similar experiences coming from other 
sectors could be useful. Nelson and Primeaux (1988) examine the relationship between 
the market and distribution costs of electricity, using a panel of 23 monopolistic and 
duopolistic American municipal firms. To this purpose, short-term cost functions are 
estimated where the variables are represented by the quantity of energy supplied, the 
characteristics of the distribution (number of customers, surface area supplied, length of 
the network), input prices and by a dummy relative to the market structure. Four 
versions of the model are estimated, ranging from a Cobb-Douglas to more flexible 
functions of a translogarithmic type. Greater flexibility improves statistical significance 
but does not bring about a better explanatory power, since the R2 is always greater than 
0.966. As well as confirming the amplifying effect on costs made by territorial 
dispersion of the service, the analysis highlights a lower efficiency for the duopolistic 
structures. 
3. A model for Italy 
3.1 Technology and explanatory variables 
Considering the above leterature and the peculiarity of the situation in Italy, the 
technology of the natural gas distribution industry is analysed with the following long-
term cost function: 
CD = f(Q,P,H,M), 
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where CD indicates the cost of gas distribution, Q is the output vector, P is the vector of 
input prices, H is the vector of the hedonistic territorial variables, and M includes some 
managerial variables. 
The model implies a cost minimizing behaviour. This hipothesys seems appropriate 
because the italian regulation establishes criteria for maximum levels of gas prices 
while not imposing controls of a rate of return type. 
The distribution cost examined is the operating cost (CD) including the purchase of 
materials and services, labour costs and the depreciation of equipments. The expenses 
for gas purchases as well a financial costs are excluded. This choice is motivated by the 
structural characteristics of supply in Italy and by the financial conditions of the 
operators in our sample. Firms in the industry do not organise the provision of the fuel, 
which is supplied to all distributors by a publicly owned firm, Snam, on the same price 
terms. On the other hand, this cost item does not influence the performance of the firms 
in that the existing tariff norms establish its transferral onto the selling price (Clò, 
1992). With regards to capital, the financial cost is not considerated because financial 
structures are not homogeneous and often a part of the debt costs incurred by municipal 
firms is payable by the council they belong to. 
In the cost function we found an output vector instead of only one quantity 
variable. This definition is in agreement with the many studies on the network services 
(Guldmann, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1989; Millward and Ward, 1987; Roberts, 1986; Nelson 
and Primeaux, 1988; Hollas, 1990; Klein, 1993; Clagget, 1994; Kim and Lee, 1996) and 
is motivated by the multi-product nature of the service. Since the distribution service 
makes use of an infrastructure linking every consumer, both the quantity distributed and 
the number of customers are important. The former influences piping diameter while the 
latter has an effect on the extension and articulation of distribution network. 
Furthermore, the clientele turns out to be composed of several categories: residential 
consumers for domestic use and heating, business and craftsman structures, large 
hospital and manufacturing plants. Each category has specific needs regarding the way 
of using gas, requirements, demand continuity and demand seasonality. The same 
number of consumers can record strong differences in the quantities sold, and vice 
versa; moreover the presence of homogeneity in volumes and consumers can also have 
different effects on the costs according to the different mix of customers. Bearing in 
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mind the nature of the data available, the following are indicated as output variables: the 
average number of consumers (AC), the quantity of gas sold to small and medium size 
consumers (civil consumption) subject to the regulation of the prices (RS), the quantity 
sold to large industrial and hospital consumers (OS). This variable presents some values 
equal to zero; consequently in the estimation procedure it has been transformed  by 
adding one to the original value. 
As far as the input prices are concerned, two proxy variables are considered: the 
average labor cost per employee (LC) and the ratio between the  book-value of 
equipment and the length of the distribution network (KC). 
The hedonic variables have the function of considering the characteristics of the 
areas where the service is supplied. The density of the customers needs great attention. 
There is complete agreement on the importance of this item in literature, while the 
measurement criteria are somewhat different. Hollas (1990), Hollas and Stansell (1991, 
1994), Evrard, Lejeune and Thiry (1994) use the ratio between the number of 
consumers and the length of the main; Sing (1987) uses the ratio between the consumers 
and the surface area served; Guldmann (1983, 1984,1985, 1989) and Millward and 
Ward (1987) refer to the ratio between inhabitants and surface area. The last two 
measurements mentioned above can be faulted. Though having the same amount of 
inhabitants, the number of consumers can vary in function of the average size of the 
household, the diffusion of the service and the consistency of the productive activities. 
On the other hand, the total surface area of the municipalities does not necessarily  
correspond to the territory served. This work considers  the reciprocal of the density 
indicated by the ratio between the kilometres of network and the number of customers 
(D). The variable correctly measures the commitment linked to the dispersion of the 
customers, because it expresses the capital intensity needed to connect the individual 
consumers as well as the onerousness of those activities whose logistics depend on the 
dispersion of the customers: maintenance, checking for leaks and meter readings. 
Another territorial component is represented by the level of urbanisation of the 
areas served (Guldmann, 1984, 1985; Clagget, 1994). This attribute tends to verify the 
effects of congestion present in the urban areas. In this work it is measured by the 
concentricity ratio (C). This indicates the share of the population resident in the 
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inhabited areas of the municipalities. It usually takes on a higher value in the big cities, 
where scattered houses have a minor impact. 
 The morphology of the territory is an important environmental component, but it 
is often overlooked in empirical analyses because it is difficult to measure. It seems 
clear that the set up costs and the management of the distribution network generate costs 
that are higher or lower depending on whether the gas is supplied in mountainous, hilly 
or flat areas. This analysis attempts at interpreting this characteristic by including the 
average altitude of the municipalities served by each firm (AL) as an explanatory 
variable1. 
The different firm policies and ownership set-ups characterise the vector of the 
managerial variables. In this context, diversification represents one of the most 
controversial policies within the distribution services of energy and water (Sing, 1987; 
Nelson and Primeaux, 1988; Hollas, 1990; Clagget, 1994). This strategy can generate 
synergies  reducing cost, but at the same time it envolves regulation problems; it can 
lead to situations of monopoly in the energy sector wich are harmful for the  consumer. 
The degree of productive specialisation (DS) is measured by the ratio between the 
employees in the gas sector and the total number of employees of the firm. The joint 
sales of products that are in competition with one another was not considered, because 
in Italy competition in the sale of alternative fuels is dominated by tax policies 
characterised by a prevailing impact of taxation on the price of energy products. 
The presence of different forms of ownership controls, including municipal firms, 
consortia, firms with state shareholdings and private firms, makes it possible to evaluate 
the role of different agency relationships between the manager and ownership (Arrow, 
1985; Borcherding, Pommerehne, Schneider, 1982). A dummy variable (DP) is included 
in order to investigate the relative performance of public firms and private ones. 
3.2 The functional form 
Literature does not provide clear indications regarding the appropriate functional 
form, considering the technology of the sector. In some cases, log-linear Cobb-Douglas 
types have been used, and translogarithmic functions have been used in others. The 
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latter ensure greater flexibility as they do not involve constant elasticity substitution 
among the productive factors. However, they raise analytical and econometric problems 
(Sing, 1987; Hollas, 1990), particularly when the sample is made up of a limited 
number of cases compared to the number of variables in investigation. Given the 
characteristics of the available data base, the use of a  Cobb-Douglas function was 
considered necessary. The model is specified as follows: 
lnCD=α0+α1lnAC+α2lnRS+α3lnOS+β1lnLC+β2lnKC+γ1lnD+γ2lnC+γ3lnΑL+τ1lnDS+τ2DP+ε 
where ε is the error term; it is assumed with normal distribution and E (ε) = 0. 
4. The data base 
The local gas distribution sector in Italy numbers around 800 operators of different 
types and sizes. About 30% of the sales is carried out by private firms and the rest by 
firms with a public set-up: firms with state shareholdings (27% of the sales), municipal 
firms and local public consortia (43%) (Briotti and Notarangelo, 1995). The data base 
reflects the market structure. The sample is made up of  31 firms, 10 of which are 
private and 21 public (municipal firms, consortia and Italgas Group units:  State-run 
firms controlled via Eni). Small, medium and large operators have been included in 
each category. Most of the firms are located in the Centre-North of the country, but it 
must be noted that the municipal firms and consortia limit their range of activity to the 
provincial territory whereas the private firms and those of the Italgas Group often have 
an operative range that covers many regions and in some cases extend their presence to 
the Southern regions. 
Information regarding 1991 and 1992 was gathered for each firm. Due to the lack 
of official statistic authorities for the whole sector the data base involved the use of 
many sources of information and a long task of homogenising the variables. 
The economic values were taken from the balance-sheet statements. In the case of 
firms offering many services, only the figures regarding the gas sector were used. So as 
to avoid non-homogeneous situations deriving from the balance sheet policies, the 
depreciation of technical equipments was elaborated once more standardising the 
                                                                                                                                               
1 In general, the increase in the elevation corresponds to the switch from flat to hilly or mountainous 
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average ordinary rate applied by the firms in the sample (6%). The technical-
commercial informations (employees, length of the network, consumers, quantities 
sold) were deduced form the balance-sheet reports or requested directly from the firms. 
The demographic-territorial indications (population, concentricity, altitude) were 
obtained by linking two sources: council statistics (taken from the 1991 Istat census) 
and  data about  areas served by each firm as listed by the Snam company  (1993, 1994). 
Table 1 shows some of the descriptive statistics of the total amount of firms 
studied. It can be seen that the size range is quite wide, especially in terms of employees 
and consumers. As far as productive factors are concerned, the unitary cost of the 
equipment systems shows a considerable variability with oscillations ranging from 
30,000 to 300,000 lira per network metre, with an average dispersion rate of around 
53%. The differences are to be attributed to the age of the plants, their composition, 
their quality level and also the efficiency costs in its making. The unitary labour cost 
shows a considerable range (from 36 to 72 million per employee), but records a fairly 
limited variability (13%); this is also due to the considerable homogeneity of the three 
labor contracts of the sector. The variability is higher for two ratios: kilometres of 
network/consumers (46%) and gas employees/total employees (35%), while the 
differences in the degree of concentricity are limited (6%). Regarding the composition 
of cost distribution, on average 27% is represented by materials and services purchased 
abroad, 43% are the labour costs and depreciation accounts for the remaining 30%. 
With reference to ownership (table 1), the output of public firms is on average 
higher  with respect to  private ones: the ratio is around 2 to 1. The average cost of 
productive factors is also higher: +19% for labor, and +87% in the case of capital (140 
against 75 thousand lira per network metre). The private firms work in territories where 
there is a lower concentration in the town centres (89% against 93%) and there is a 
decisively higher dispersion of customers (14,4 against 9,2 network metres per 
consumer). These aspects, along with the higher altitude of the towns supplied (209 
metres against 109), show that private firms have their barycentre veered towards non-
urban centres and hilly and mountainous areas. Finally, publicly owned firms turn out to 
be more diversified (lower impact of employees relative to gas distribution) and have a 
                                                                                                                                               
areas. 
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greater impact on labour costs (47% against 36% of distribution costs), compensated by 
a lower impact of the capital cost (27% against 36%). 
5. Results  
The estimate of the total cost function previously defined was carried out by means 
of the ordinary least squared method, and the results are listed in table 2. The 
explanatory value of the estimated function is particularly good. The R2 shows that the 
model explains more than 99.5% of the cost variability within the data base. 
Since each firm of the data-base was observed over two years, a cost function 
including a time dummy variable has been estimated. The hypothesis that its coefficient 
is equal to zero cannot be rejected at 1% level of significance. This result allows to 
overlook the presence of fixed yearly effects. 
Regarding the single variables, the number of consumers turns out to be the only 
output component to be significant. This result confirms the prevailing opinion of the 
sector experts on the low marginal impact of the quantity supplied (customers being 
equal) on distribution costs. Sales to domestic and large consumers are lacking in 
statistical significance.  
As far as the vector of input prices is concerned, the unitary labour cost is not 
significant. This result must be considered with care. As previously mentioned, there 
are significant differences between the single salaries of the public firms and private 
ones. In particular, the private firms have average salaries that are 16% lower. The non-
significance of the variable in question  can then be partly explained considering the 
correlation that exists between the same and the dummy relative to the ownership set-
ups. The price of the equipments, on the other hand, shows a significant positive 
correlation with the cost level. This means that the different conditions of unitary cost in 
setting up the structure have a great effect on the depreciation size and consequently on 
the final distribution cost. However, it must be remembered that the strictness of the 
adopted safety norms affects costs, but these qualitative attributes (quality of the 
material, depth of the pipes, automatic systems for the uninterrupted monitoring of the 
network) turn out to be difficult to quantify. 
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All territorial variables are significant. The dispersion of the customers has a great 
amplifying effect on the costs. This situation indicates the presence of density 
economies and can be traced back to two factors. The dispersion increases both the 
average number of network metres necessary to link the individual consumer and the 
supply costs, such as meter-readings, repair of breakdowns and maintenance. The 
estimated function coefficient makes it possible to appreciate the impact of the density 
economies on total cost. It is possible to carry out a sensitivity analysis by 
hypothesising number of customers and sales variations, in equal proportion, on the 
same territorial area served. Table 3 highlights that in the face of a doubling of the 
average output, with the same network, costs increase only by 45%. With regard to the 
dispersion range of the sample, cost elasticity with respect to customers and volumes 
turns out to be placed at around 0.5%. 
Concentricity also shows a positive and significant coefficient: as the share of the 
population resident in the town centres increases, so too do the distribution costs. Since 
concentricity is higher in the large cities, this result can be  explained by the existence 
of diseconomies linked to urban congestion. It is a matter of difficulties in the running 
of the service relative to areas characterised by intense flows of goods and people, and 
by the presence of town-planning and architectural constraints.  
The significance of the variable that measures altitude confirms the greater 
complexity of the service provided in hilly and mountainous areas. 
Among the managerial variables, productive specialisation has negative effects. 
The firms that are diversified in the offer of other public services (particularly electrical, 
water and environmental ones) obtain cost advantages (scope economies). A high 
significance of the dummy relative to ownership shows a clear cost differential in 
favour of private firms. On the same conditions, the latter have values that are around 
30% lower than the public ones. The level of efficiency offers an important contribution 
in the explanation of such a performance, since the physical productivity of the inputs, 
in particular of labour (consumers/employees ratio), turns out to be different. The gaps 
highlighted can be partly explained by the differences in the quality levels of the service 
offered that can not be measured objectively. 
The study of scale economies focuses on the multi-size nature of the output. Panzar 
and Willig (1977) and Baumol (1977) propose the observation of the total cost 
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behaviour on the varying, in equal measure, of all the output. There will be scale 
economies that are constant, increasing or decreasing to the extent of how the total cost 
is increasing respectively in equal proportion, lower or higher than that of all the output. 
In the case of natural gas distribution, the analysis involves the study of the joint effects 
of the variation of the number of consumers and volumes sold. Considering the nature 
of the functional form used, the coefficients of the variables referred to above show the 
output elasticity of the costs and therefore the reciprocal sum of such coefficients 
highlights the characteristics of scale economies. Since this sum is significantly not 
different from one, it can reasonably be argued that the natural gas distribution industry 
in Italy is characterised by constant scale economies. 
6. Policy indications 
The analysis of the technological characters in the gas sector in Italy has provided 
results that are consistent with international evidence, but has at the same time shown 
some peculiarities that must be considered within the current context aimed at the 
privatisation and liberalisation of the market. 
The confirmation of constant scale economies indicates that the local size increase 
does not reduce the long-term costs. The statement excludes the financial costs (not 
available for this analysis) which in effect could be lower if large operators have greater 
contractual power. In any case, the absence of economies of scale ensures that the sector 
policies aimed at improving efficiency can be independent from the local size of the 
service. This does not mean that the size level of the firm can always be overlooked. In 
fact, it must be remembered that diversification activities towards the water and 
electricity sectors generate scope economies. Therefore, technology would seem to 
suggest the usefulness of policies geared towards the increase in size of the firms by 
means of the management of diversified activities within the territories served. This 
process can create synergies, but at the same time problems linked to the acquisition of 
monopoly power in the energy sector. In this context a good regulation can create the 
correct balance between technical efficiency and control of the monopoly rent. 
Competitivity and regulation are involved from several points of view. 
The importance of the average price of physical capital (unitary value per network 
kilometre) in outlining cost performance indicates the need for competitivity about 
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inputs. The estimate makes it possible to state that the price for each kilometre of 
network is certainly influenced by the characteristics of the area where the service is 
provided, but, ceteris paribus, it presents gaps that suggests a change in the 
management of the biddings for the equipments. The lower average price of the network 
run by the private sector rather than the public one leads to the conclusion that a greater 
transparency and competitivity in allocating the new public productive capacity is 
fundamental. 
However, it can be felt that savings in the unitary costs can be more profitably and 
quickly obtained by means of a parallel activity geared towards a wide competition for 
the market and greater effectiveness in the tariff system. 
It is hard to avoid the situation of natural local monopoly, but a competitive 
management in the renewal of concessions so as to limit structural and running costs is 
possible. Alongside such a process there must be a further evolution of the pricing 
system moving from a sort of cost-plus towards price-cap, so as to create stimuli for 
efficiency to the advantage of the consumer. Moreover, the results of this research reject 
the hypothesis of a single national tariff, given the influence exerted by the territorial 
variables. The need to safeguard the qualitative levels of the service leads to the 
introduction in the  tariff devices of qualitative parameters that can be measured 
objectively (they are already being used in the English model) such as: number of 
accidents, breakdowns, leaks and interruptions of the service. 
7. Conclusions 
The estimate of the cost function of Italian natural gas distribution firms has 
identified a great number of factors explaining the differences in service cost levels. 
Having detected the fundamental importance of the number of customers served 
and the marginal impact of the volumes sold on the cost levels, it is necessary to pay 
attention to many other variables considered in the research. The work reveals the 
influence of territorial and managerial factors. The analysis of dispersion of customers 
shows the possibility of obtaining strong density economies. It is equally important to 
see the effects of the type of ownership and the role of the unitary cost of plants, with a 
clear differential in favour of private firms. Then, in order of importance, the 
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concentration of the population in urban areas reveals diseconomies of congestion, the 
altitude of the towns shows the importance of the territorial morphology and the degree 
of diversification of the firms indicates the benefits of multi-service offers. The analysis 
of the scale economies does not point to an optimal size for the firm. Nevertheless it 
must be considered that small firms can have more difficulty in disposing of financial 
resources necessary to build structures that guarantee suitable qualitative standards. 
The overall results suggest the need of introducing some suitable competitive 
devices concerning the regulation of input prices and the renewal of the procedures for 
granting concessions. Finally, a review of the tariff system aimed at recuperating 
efficiency, in respect of the constraints of a territorial nature and of the safeguarding of 
the qualitative levels of the service, is desiderable too. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics of the data base 
Variables Units of     measure 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Value 
Average 
total 
firms 
Variation 
coefficient  
% 
Average 
private 
firms 
Average 
public 
firms 
Average number of customers Thousands 4.0 1062.9 222.2 113.3 113.8 273.8
Volumes sold Millions of mc 9.0 1207.5 347.6 98.7 212.5 411.9
Volumes sold to domestic customers. Millions of mc 9.0 973.7 299.8 97.0 186.3 353.9
Volumes sold to large customer Millions of mc 0.0 236.0 47.7 122.7 26.2 58.0
Vol. Large customers/Total vol. sold  0.000 0.270 0.124 51.9 0.123 0.125
Volumes sold / Customers mc 561 2858 1938 29.6 2139 1843
Length network Km 39.1 7694.5 1805.6 97.7 1457.7 1971.3
Length network / Customers m 3.4 24.1 10.9 45.8 14.4 9.2
Inhabitants on concentric / Total in h.  0.740 1.000 0.917 6.3 0.894 0.928
Average altitude m 1 405 141 71.9 209 109
Average number of. gas employees  6 2170 422 120.8 157 548
Gas employees/Total employees  0.147 1.000 0.799 35.1 1.000 0.704
Labour cost/Gas employees Millions £ 36.5 72.3 60.7 13.0 53.8 64.0
Customers/Gas employees no. 433 1777 642 41.3 874 531
Cost of equipments/Length network Thousands £ 30.4 300.3 118.6 53.4 74.7 139.6
Distribution costs Millions £ 611 255887 54436 115.6 19741 70957
External costs/Total distribution costs  0.182 0.465 0.269 22.8 0.281 0.264
Labour cost/Total distribution costs  0.185 0.619 0.433 21.5 0.360 0.467
Depreciation/Total distribution costs 0.169 0.623 0.298 30.3 0.359 0.269
No. cases 62  20 42 
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Table 2 - Gas distribution costs functions 
Variable Coefficients t Significance 
AC α1 1.046001 (24.781) 0.0000 
RS α2 -0.024305 (-0.576) 0.5668 
OS α3 -0.020398 (-0.863) 0.3922 
LC β1 0.075153 (0.587) 0.5595 
KC β2 0.363264 (5.300) 0.0000 
D γ1 0.465575 (6.547) 0.0000 
C γ2 1.010696 (3.180) 0.0025 
AL γ3 0.030116 (2.268) 0.0276 
DS τ1 0.088647 (1.919) 0.0605 
DP τ2 -0.346560 (-6.466) 0.0000 
Intercept α0 2.388147 (4.273) 0.0001 
AdjR2      0.9954 F=(1323.670) 0.0000 
 
 
Table  3 - Density economies in gas distribution 
Outputs (customers and volumes sold) (a) [*] 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Customer dispersion  [*] 2 1 0.667 0.5 0.4 0.333
Index of total distribution costs (b) 0.690 1.000 1.243 1.450 1.634 1.802
Changing in output (∆a/a) - 1.000 0.500 0.333 0.250 0.200
Changing in costs (∆b/b) - 0.450 0.243 0.167 0.127 0.103
Cost elasticity (∆b/b)/(∆a/a) - 0.450 0.486 0.500 0.508 0.513
[*] Mean value of the sample equal to 1. 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 13/1997 
 
 19
Bibliography 
Arrow K.S. (1985), “The Economics of Agency”, in Agency: The Structure of Business,  
Pratt S.W. and Zeckhauser R., Cambridge, MA, Harvard Business School. 
Baumol W.J. (1977), “On the proper cost tests for natural monopoly in a multiproduct 
industry”, American Economic Review, 67(5), pgs. 809-822. 
Borcherding T.E., Pommrehne W.W., Schneider F. (1982), “Comparing the Efficiency 
of Private and Public Production: The Evidence from Five Countries”, in 
Nationalökonomie Journal of Economics, suppl. 2, pgs. 127-156. 
Briotti M.G., Notarangelo E. (1995),”Il mercato del gas naturale in Italia tra 
liberalizzazione e privatizzazione”, Rivista di Politica Economica, December, 
pgs.187-219. 
Claggett E.T. (1994), “A cost function study of the providers of TVA power”, 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 15 (1), pgs. 63-72. 
Clò A. (1992), “Regolamentazione e concorrenza nei servizi di pubblica utilità: il caso 
del gas”, L'Industria, 13 (2), pgs. 247-268. 
Evrard O., Lejeune B., Thiry B. (1994), “Coùt de la distribution d’eau en Wallonie et a 
Bruxelles, Estimation d’une fonction de coùt hédonique”, Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 65(2), pgs. 333-360. 
Fondazione Rosselli (1995), “I servizi di pubblica utilità in Italia”, Rapporto sullo stato 
e sulle condizioni di sviluppo, 1995, Torino, La Rosa. 
Guldmann J.M. (1983), “Modelling the structure of gas distribution costs in urban 
areas”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 13(3), pgs. 299-316. 
Guldmann J.M. (1984), “A further note on the structure of gas distribution costs in 
urban areas”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 14, pgs. 583-588. 
Guldmann J.M. (1985), “Economies of scale and natural monopoly in urban utilities: 
the case of natural gas distribution”, Geographical Analysis, 17(4), pgs. 302-317. 
Guldmann J.M. (1989), “Capacity cost allocation in the provision of urban public 
distribution utilities”, Growth and Change, 20(2), pgs. 1-18. 
Hollas D.R. (1990), “Firm and interruptible pricing patterns: public versus private gas 
distribution utilities”, Southern Economic Journal, 57(2), pgs. 371-393. 
Hollas D.R., Stansell S.R. (1988), “Regulation, interfirm rivalry, and the economic 
efficiency of natural gas distribution facilities”, Quaterly Review of Economics and 
Business, 28(4), pgs. 21-37. 
Hollas D.R., Stansell S.R. (1991), “Regulation, ownership form and the economic 
efficiency of rural electric distribution cooperatives”, The Review of Regional 
Studies, 21(2), pgs. 201-220. 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 13/1997 
 
 20
Hollas D.R., Stansell S.R. (1994), “The economic efficiency of public vs. private gas 
distribution utilities”, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 65(2), pgs. 281-
300. 
Kim T.Y., Lee J.D. (1996), “Cost analysis of gas distribution industry with spatial 
variables”, The Journal of Energy and Development, 20 (2), pgs. 247-267. 
Klein C.C. (1993), “A comparison of cost-based pricing rules for natural gas 
distribution utilities”, Energy Economics, July pgs. 176-182.  
Millward R., Ward R. (1987), “The costs of public and private gas enterprise in late 
19th century britain”, Oxford Economic Papers, 39(4), pgs. 719-737. 
Nelson R.A., Primeaux W.J. (1988), “The effects of competition on transmission and 
distribution costs in the municipal electric industry”, Land Economics, 64(4), pgs. 
338-346. 
Panzar J.C., Willig R.D. (1977), “Economies of  scale in multi-output production”, 
Quaterly Journal of  Economics, 91, pgs 481-493. 
Panzar J.C., Willig R.D. (1981), “Economies of scope”, The American Economic 
Review, 71(2), pgs. 268-272. 
Roberts M.J. (1986), “Economies of density and size in the production and delivery of 
electric power”, Lands Economics, 62 (4), pgs. 378-387. 
Sing M. (1977), “Are combination gas and electric utilities multiproduct natural 
monopolies?”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, pgs. 392-398. 
Snam (1993,1994), Aziende distributrici nei comuni serviti dalla rete dei metanodotti, 
Situazione al 31/12/1991; ibidem, Situazione al 31/12/1992. 
 
 
 
WORKING  PAPER  SERIES (1997-1993) 
1997 
1/97 Multinationality, diversification  and firm size. An empirical analysis of Europe's leading firms, by Stephen 
Davies, Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, January 
2/97 Qualità totale e organizzazione del lavoro nelle aziende sanitarie, by Gian Franco Corio, January 
3/97 Reorganising the product and process development in Fiat Auto, by Giuseppe Calabrese, February  
4/97 Buyer-supplier best practices in product development: evidence from car industry, by Giuseppe Calabrese, April 
5/97 L’innovazione nei distretti industriali. Una rassegna ragionata della letteratura, by Elena Ragazzi, April 
6/97 The impact of financing constraints on markups: theory and evidence from Italian firm level data, by Anna 
Bottasso, Marzio Galeotti and Alessandro Sembenelli, April 
7/97 Capacità competitiva e evoluzione strutturale dei settori di specializzazione: il caso delle macchine per 
confezionamento e imballaggio, by Secondo Rolfo, Paolo Vaglio, April 
8/97 Tecnologia e produttività delle aziende elettriche municipalizzate, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Piercarlo Frigero, 
April 
9/97 La normativa nazionale e regionale per l’innovazione e la qualità nelle piccole e medie imprese: leggi, risorse, 
risultati e nuovi strumenti, by Giuseppe Calabrese, June 
10/97 European integration and leading firms’ entry and exit strategies, by Steve Davies, Laura Rondi and Alessandro 
Sembenelli, April 
11/97 Does debt discipline state-owned firms? Evidence from a panel of Italian firms, by Elisabetta Bertero and Laura 
Rondi, July 
12/97 Distretti industriali e innovazione: i limiti dei sistemi tecnologici locali, by Secondo Rolfo and Giampaolo 
Vitali, July 
13/97 Costs, technology and ownership form of natural gas distribution in Italy, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Roberto 
Giandrone, July 
14/97 Costs and structure of technology in the Italian water industry, by Paola Fabbri and Giovanni Fraquelli, July 
15/97 Aspetti e misure della customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction, by Maria Teresa Morana, July 
16/97 La qualità nei servizi pubblici: limiti della normativa UNI EN 29000 nel settore sanitario, by Efisio Ibba, July 
17/97 Investimenti, fattori finanziari e ciclo economico, by Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, rivisto sett. 1998 
18/97 Strategie di crescita esterna delle imprese leader in Europa: risultati preliminari dell'utilizzo del data-base 
Ceris "100 top EU firms' acquisition/divestment database 1987-1993", by Giampaolo Vitali and Marco 
Orecchia, December 
19/97 Struttura e attività dei Centri Servizi all'innovazione: vantaggi e limiti dell'esperienza italiana, by Monica 
Cariola, December 
20/97 Il comportamento ciclico dei margini di profitto in presenza di mercati del capitale meno che perfetti: un'analisi 
empirica su dati di impresa in Italia, by Anna Bottasso, December 
 
 
 
1996 
1/96 Aspetti e misure della produttività. Un'analisi statistica su tre aziende elettriche europee, by Donatella 
Cangialosi, February 
2/96 L'analisi e la valutazione della soddisfazione degli utenti interni: un'applicazione nell'ambito dei servizi sanitari, 
by Maria Teresa Morana, February 
3/96 La funzione di costo nel servizio idrico. Un contributo al dibattito sul metodo normalizzato per la 
determinazione della tariffa del servizio idrico integrato, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Paola Fabbri, February 
4/96 Coerenza d'impresa e diversificazione settoriale: un'applicazione alle società leaders nell'industria 
manifatturiera europea, by Marco Orecchia, February 
5/96 Privatizzazioni: meccanismi di collocamento e assetti proprietari. Il caso STET, by Paola Fabbri, February 
6/96 I nuovi scenari competitivi  nell'industria delle telecomunicazioni: le principali esperienze internazionali, by 
Paola Fabbri, February 
7/96 Accordi, joint-venture e investimenti diretti dell'industria italiana nella CSI: Un'analisi qualitativa, by Chiara 
Monti and Giampaolo Vitali, February 
8/96 Verso la riconversione di settori utilizzatori di amianto.  Risultati di un'indagine sul campo, by Marisa Gerbi 
Sethi, Salvatore Marino  and Maria Zittino, February 
9/96 Innovazione tecnologica e competitività internazionale: quale futuro per i distretti e le economie locali, by 
Secondo Rolfo, March 
10/96 Dati disaggregati e analisi della struttura industriale: la matrice europea delle quote di mercato, by Laura 
Rondi, March 
11/96 Le decisioni di entrata e di uscita: evidenze empiriche sui maggiori gruppi italiani, by Alessandro Sembenelli 
and Davide Vannoni, April 
12/96 Le direttrici della diversificazione nella grande industria italiana, by Davide Vannoni, April 
13/96 R&S cooperativa e non-cooperativa in un duopolio misto con spillovers, by Marco Orecchia, May 
14/96 Unità di studio sulle strategie di crescita esterna delle imprese italiane, by Giampaolo Vitali and Maria Zittino, 
July. Not available 
15/96 Uno strumento di politica per l'innovazione: la prospezione tecnologica, by Secondo Rolfo, September 
16/96 L'introduzione della Qualità Totale in aziende ospedaliere: aspettative ed opinioni del middle management, by 
Gian Franco Corio, September 
17/96 Shareholders’ voting power and block transaction premia: an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies, by 
Giovanna Nicodano and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
18/96 La valutazione dell'impatto delle politiche tecnologiche: un'analisi classificatoria e una rassegna di alcune 
esperienze europee, by Domiziano Boschi, November 
19/96 L'industria orafa italiana: lo sviluppo del settore punta sulle esportazioni, by Anna Maria Gaibisso and Elena 
Ragazzi, November 
20/96 La centralità dell'innovazione nell'intervento pubblico nazionale e regionale in Germania, by Secondo Rolfo, 
December 
21/96 Ricerca, innovazione e mercato: la nuova politica del Regno Unito, by Secondo Rolfo, December 
22/96 Politiche per l'innovazione in Francia, by Elena Ragazzi, December 
23/96 La relazione tra struttura finanziaria e decisioni reali delle imprese: una rassegna critica dell'evidenza 
empirica, by Anna Bottasso, December 
 
 
1995 
1/95 Form of ownership and financial constraints: panel data evidence on leverage and investment  choices by Italian 
firms, by Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, March 
2/95 Regulation of the electric supply industry in Italy, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Elena Ragazzi, March 
3/95 Restructuring product development and production networks: Fiat Auto, by Giuseppe Calabrese, September 
4/95 Explaining corporate structure: the MD matrix, product differentiation and size of market, by Stephen Davies, 
Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
5/95 Regulation and total productivity performance in electricity: a comparison  between Italy, Germany and France, 
by Giovanni Fraquelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
6/95 Strategie di crescita esterna nel sistema bancario italiano: un'analisi empirica 1987-1994, by Stefano Olivero 
and Giampaolo Vitali, December 
7/95 Panel Ceris su dati di impresa: aspetti metodologici e istruzioni per l'uso, by Diego Margon, Alessandro 
Sembenelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
 
1994 
1/94 Una politica industriale per gli investimenti esteri in Italia: alcune riflessioni, by Giampaolo Vitali, May 
2/94 Scelte cooperative in attività di ricerca e sviluppo, by Marco Orecchia, May 
3/94 Perché le matrici intersettoriali per misurare l'integrazione verticale?, by Davide Vannoni, July 
4/94 Fiat Auto: A simultaneous engineering experience, by Giuseppe Calabrese, August 
 
1993 
1/93 Spanish machine tool industry, by Giuseppe Calabrese, November 
2/93 The machine tool industry in Japan, by Giampaolo Vitali, November 
3/93 The UK machine tool industry,  by Alessandro Sembenelli  and Paul Simpson, November 
4/93 The Italian  machine tool industry, by Secondo Rolfo, November 
5/93 Firms' financial and real responses to business cycle shocks and monetary tightening: evidence for large and 
small Italian companies, by Laura Rondi, Brian Sack, Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, 
December 
 
 
 
Free copies are distributed on request to Universities, Research Institutes, researchers, students, etc. 
Please, write to: 
MARIA ZITTINO, Working Papers Coordinator, CERIS-CNR 
Via Real Collegio, 30; 10024 Moncalieri (Torino), Italy 
Tel.  +39 011 6824.914;     Fax  +39 011 6824.966;  m.zittino@ceris.cnr.it; http://www.ceris.cnr.it 
